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Abstract: Despite allowing for the unprecedented visualization of brain functional activity, modern neurobiological tech-
niques have not yet been able to provide satisfactory answers to important questions about the relationship between brain 
and mind. The aim of this paper is to show how two different but complementary approaches, Mind Operational Seman-
tics (OS) and Brain Operational Architectonics (OA), can help bridge the gap between a specific kind of mental activity—
the higher-order reflective thought or linguistic thought—and brain. The fundamental notion that allows the two different 
approaches to be jointly used under a common framework is that of operation. According to OS, which is based on intro-
spection and linguistic data, the meanings of words can be analyzed in terms of elemental mental operations (EOMC), 
amongst which those of attention play a key role. Linguistic thought is made possible by special kinds of elements, which 
OS calls “correlators”, which have the function of tying together the other elements of thought, which OS calls “correlata” 
(a "correlational network” that is, a sentence, is so formed). Therefore, OS conceives of linguistic thought as a hierarchy 
of operations of increasing complexity. Likewise, according to OA, which is based on the joint analysis of cognitive and 
electromagnetic data (EEG and MEG), every conscious phenomenon is brought to existence by the joint operations of 
many functional and transient neuronal assemblies in the brain. According to OA, the functioning of the brain is always 
operational (made up of operations), and its structure is characterized by a hierarchy of operations of increasing complex-
ity: single neurons, single assemblies of neurons, synchronized neuronal assemblies or Operational Modules (OM), inte-
grated or complex OMs. The authors put forward the hypothesis that the whole level of OS’s description (EOMC, correla-
tors, and correlational networks) corresponds to the level of OMs (or set of them) of different complexity within OA’s 
theory: EOMC could correspond to simple OMs, correlators to complex OMs and the correlational network to a set of 
simple and complex OMs. Finally, a set of experiments is proposed to verify the putative correspondence between OS and 
OA and prove the existence of an integrated continuum between brain and mind. 
Keywords: Mental categories, consciousness, linguistic thought, language, attention, mental operations, EEG, functional 
synchrony, connectivity, metastability. 
INTRODUCTION 
  Despite allowing for the unprecedented visualization of 
brain functional activity, modern neurobiological techniques 
have not yet been able to provide satisfactory answers to 
important questions about the relationship between brain and 
mind. Precisely, in the specific field of the studies of the 
relationship between brain and reflective consciousness [1], 
where the natural human language plays an important role, 
there is still no common consensus among neuroscientists 
even about which cortical areas (or neural processes) are 
involved in the processing of, and phenomenally constitut-
ing, the meanings of words. For example, on the basis of 
both lesion and positron emission tomography (PET) data, 
Tranel and Damasio [2] emphasize the role of the left   
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inferior and middle temporal gyri, while based on PET and 
electroencephalographic (EEG) data, Posner and Di Giro-
lamo [3] argue for semantic processes in left inferior frontal 
areas. At the same time, based on magnetoencephalographic 
(MEG) evidence, Salmelin, Helenius, and Kuukka [4] claim 
that the left superior temporal lobe is relevant for word se-
mantics; and Skrandies [5] reports EEG studies highlighting 
the importance of the occipital lobes in distinguishing word 
meanings, whilst Pulvermüller [6] stresses the importance of 
primary motor, premotor and prefrontal areas for word-
meaning processing. 
  As Pulvermüller has properly observed referring to the 
difficulty of modern neurobiological techniques to localize 
the cortical areas involved in semantic processing, probably 
this shortcoming of cognitive neuroscience is partly due to 
the lack of an adequate theoretical apparatus: “In spite of the 
undeniable progress made possible by empirical results ob-
tained with newly introduced techniques, it is likely that 
theoretical advances are necessary as well” (Ref. [7], pp. 47).  
  In our opinion, in order to identify the brain structures 
and mechanisms responsible for the production of higher-
order mental phenomena such as thought and semantic proc-54    The Open Neuroimaging Journal, 2010, Volume 4  Benedetti et al. 
essing, a theoretical framework proposing what to look for 
and at which level to do it is the necessary guide. To be ade-
quate, this theoretical framework should be able to connect 
the phenomenal aspects of consciousness and their underly-
ing brain mechanisms. Using Revonsuo’s words (Ref. [1], 
pp. xvi), one “should take very seriously both the subjective 
psychological reality of consciousness and the objective neu-
robiological reality” in their intimate connectedness within a 
single integrated continuum. 
  Indeed, only an adequate theoretical apparatus can pro-
vide cognitive neuroscience with the level of description and 
explanation necessary to carry out its investigations. In gen-
eral, cognitive neuroscience is interested in discovering how 
the brain makes possible and realizes cognitive phenomena 
such as language, consciousness, attention, memory, etc.: in 
a word, to have a mental life. In order to achieve this aim, 
cognitive neuroscience usually tries to find out where in the 
brain, in which brain areas, a particular cognitive phenome-
non is located; what kind of neuron circuit implements it; at 
which point in time the phenomenon takes place compared 
to the neural process. Cognitive neuroscience tries then to 
give an account in physical terms of cognitive, mental phe-
nomena.  
  It is quite easy to realize that such an account cannot be 
given without having first formulated a theoretical model 
that explains how cognitive phenomena are produced, what 
they consist of, and, more in general, how our mind works. 
Indeed, in order to identify the brain structures and mecha-
nisms responsible for the production of cognitive phenom-
ena, one needs a criterion by means of which one under-
stands where, what, how and when to look for and to ob-
serve. The physical field can be subdivided in so many dif-
ferent levels (the micro-level of the atoms and sub-atomic 
particles; the medium-level of cells and neurons; the macro-
level of the neuronal assemblies and nets of these assem-
blies, etc.), and observed from so many different angles (as 
an isolated unit, as a composite system, as a dynamic struc-
ture, etc.) that without a criterion or guide for deciding 
where, what, how and when to observe, one cannot even 
start a research. Where should one address it? What should 
be the more appropriate level of observation of the physical 
phenomena: the level of the atoms composing neurons, the 
level of neurons, or the level of the assemblies of neurons? 
How, and on what basis, could one explain the relationships 
between the various elements composing each physical 
level? What criterion should one adopt to analyze the rela-
tionships between the different physical levels? More in gen-
eral, how can one explain the transition from the physical 
level to the mental one?  
  What should this theoretical model look like in order to 
adequately support both cognitive (phenomenal, psychologi-
cal, linguistic, neuropsychological, neuro-linguistic) data and 
their neurophysiologic underlying mechanisms? We believe 
it should be an operational model, that is, a framework cen-
tred on the notion of “operation”. Let us see the main rea-
sons that led us to believe this: 
1) Mental phenomena are not mere copies of the external 
world, but are the product of the subject’s activity. As 
such they can best be described and analyzed in terms of 
the operations performed by the subject’s mind to 
produce them. 
  In general, there is clear evidence in many experiential 
fields that even basic mental phenomena such as perception, 
attention and memory do not simply reflect what is “out 
there”, but are the result of specific (voluntary and involun-
tary) cognitive processes of the subject. For example, well 
known phenomena in time perception, such as “prior entry” 
[8, 9] and “temporal displacement” (Zeitverschiebung) [10, 
11] clearly show that the way the subject perceives the se-
quence of events is determined not so much by the objective, 
physical sequence of the events, but by cognitive factors: the 
way the subject deploy its attention; whether the sequence of 
events occur within the so called “phenomenal present” [11], 
which is strictly linked to specific cortical rhythms [12]; and 
so on. Space perception is similarly determined by cognitive 
factors [13]. Moreover, very basic sensations such as pain 
and pleasure exist which certainly do no represent things and 
objects of the outside world [14].  
  More specifically, the fact that mental phenomena are not 
mere copies of the external word is testified by higher-order 
mental phenomena such as reflective thought, conceptualiza-
tion and imagination. Indeed, it is always possible to think 
about, describe, categorize or imagine even the simplest 
physical situation or object in two or more different ways, 
and two or more different situations or objects in the same 
way. Linguistic syntax is nothing less than the most evident 
way human beings have of bringing forth and realizing this, 
by variously linking, combining, re-combining and dividing 
phenomenal elements in various ways. 
  What all this shows is that the mind does not so much 
passively duplicate the external world, but rather actively 
selects, discards and combines sensory, memory and concep-
tual data according to both inherited and acquired cognitive 
principles, in order to satisfy the subject’s personal motiva-
tions, objectives, and attitudes, as well as social and cultural 
constraints and habits. The human mind is first and foremost 
an “operating mind”. 
2) As Ceccato has extensively shown in his work [15-19], 
what allows one to relate the mind and the brain, the 
mental field and the physical field - and consequently to 
compare them, as well as distinguish the former from the 
latter - are the concepts of activity and operations.  
  Mental activity (at least, the conscious one; see Ref. [20]) 
is characterized by the fact that its products coincide with the 
activity itself, in the sense that they last and are present only 
as long as the activity itself takes place. Let us consider, for 
instance, the thought of a burning tree: the thought (that is, 
the product of your mental operations) is present in the mind 
only as long as you think about it, and decays as soon as you 
stop thinking about it (that is, when you stop performing 
those specific mental operations).  
  Physical activity in the physical world, on the contrary, is 
characterized by the fact that its products survive the activity 
itself, and remain quite visible even after the activity is over: 
when we burn a piece of wood, we can see the product of the 
physical activity (the ashes) quite clearly even after it has 
ended.  
  The intimate connectedness between consciousness and 
neurobiological reality mentioned by Revonsuo [1] can then 
be found by utilizing the concept of “operation”: by means 
of it, we can capture, on the one hand, the kind of activity the Mind Operational Semantics and Brain Operational Architectonics  The Open Neuroimaging Journal, 2010, Volume 4    55 
mind performs when producing conscious mental phenom-
ena, and, on the other hand, the physical, brain activity that 
is necessary to support mental activity.  
  Therefore, the most proper way of describing higher-
order mental phenomena is by looking for and analysing the 
operations producing them, that is, by adopting an opera-
tional approach (for a more detailed discussion, see Ref. 
[21-27]). In this sense “operation” stands for the process or 
series of acts that are limited in time. This provides a basis 
for discussion of the relative complexity of operations, 
where there is a more complex operation/operational act that 
subsumes the simpler ones [27, 28].  
  Once an operational theory of mental phenomena in gen-
eral and linguistic thought in particular is developed, it be-
comes possible to look for the neurophysiological basis of 
the operations producing them. Neurophysiological research 
will then be provided with a theoretical framework capable 
of guiding its investigations in a reasoned and methodical 
way. In turn, neurophysiological research will have the pos-
sibility of either confirming or falsifying the theorized postu-
lates, and in the latter case it will lead theoreticians to mod-
ify their hypothesis, or adjust their analyses. 
  As Silvio Ceccato [15, 18] argued many years ago, only 
an operational model would be able to provide a suitable and 
viable criterion capable of directing the research investiga-
tion of what is considered to be the physical substratum of 
the mind: the brain. In fact, by analysing and considering our 
conscious mental world as a hierarchy of carefully organized 
self-presenting phenomenal patterns (which are both the ob-
ject and the act/operation at the same time [1, 29]), produced 
by the activity of some physical system (the brain as a 
whole, or its parts), it is possible to assign to every single 
neurophysiological operation some mental property or pat-
tern. In this way, the road is open to the systematic and de-
tailed research of the physical (neurophisiological) basis of 
the phenomenal world: by subsequent and finer and finer 
manipulations of the physical brain substratum, one can em-
pirically determine and isolate the system(s) that is (are) re-
sponsible for the instantiation of specific phenomenal fea-
tures or patterns. The opposite strategy is also possible, that 
is, firstly isolating higher-order mental phenomena such as 
thought and semantic processing (or some other phenomenal 
pattern of subjective experience) and secondly trying to iden-
tify the neurophysiological pattern that is responsible for 
them or accompanies them. 
  The notion of operation, then, is the fundamental and 
central one in bridging the gap between brain and mind: it is 
precisely by means of this notion
1 that it is possible to iden-
tify what at the same time belongs to the phenomenal con-
scious level and to the neurophysiological level of brain ac-
tivity organization, and mediates between them [27, 30]. 
  In this article, we will present two different but comple-
mentary operational approaches to mind and brain: Opera-
tional Semantics (OS) and Operational Architectonics (OA). 
These two approaches had a completely independent origin, 
and belong to two different fields of research. OS, which was 
put forward by Benedetti and Marchetti following in the 
footsteps of Ceccato [16-19], is essentially based on intro-
                                                 
1 Importantly, it has to be noticed that operations can be of different complexity [28]. 
spection and the analysis of linguistic data. This approach, 
therefore, can be classified between Cognitive Psychology 
and Linguistics. Among other things, OS has led to the for-
mulation of an operational theory of the nature and structure 
of linguistic thought, that is, of the kind of reflective thought 
that lies at the basis of human language, and of which human 
language is the expression.  
  OA, on the contrary, is based on the joint analysis of 
cognitive and electromagnetic (EEG and MEG) data. This 
approach originated from the work of Kaplan [31-33] and 
was further modified and developed into a complete theo-
retical framework by Andrew and Alexander Fingelkurts 
[26-28, 34-36]. According to this theory, whenever any pat-
tern of phenomenality (including reflective thought) is in-
stantiated, there is a neurophysiological pattern of appropri-
ate kind that corresponds to it [30, 37]. These patterns (ex-
pressed as virtual operational modules) are brought into exis-
tence by joint operations of many functional and transient 
neuronal assemblies in the brain.  
  The aim of this theoretical paper is to show that these 
approaches are correspondent to each other through the 
shared notion of operation, which is central for the higher-
order reflective thought/language (OS approach) and the 
functioning of brain (OA approach). In this paper, firstly, we 
will consider briefly the main principles of both theories. 
Secondly, we will illuminate what the supposed correspon-
dence between them could be. And thirdly, we will consider 
the main implications deriving from the combination of these 
two approaches, namely the possibility of experimentally 
and empirically verifying by means of the neurobiological 
approach the hypotheses put forward, and the analyses per-
formed, by the introspective-linguistic approach. 
OPERATIONAL SEMANTICS (OS) 
  Since two theories (OS and OA) and their possible corre-
spondence have to be introduced in the restricted space of an 
article, only the essential outlines of OS are shown here. A 
more in-depth introduction can be found in the main refer-
ences [20, 23, 38]. The difference between this kind of se-
mantics and the other kinds of semantics has been variously 
described: Benedetti [38] for example outlines the difference 
between OS and Natural Semantic Metalanguage [39-46]; 
Marchetti [20] outlines the difference between OS (which he 
also calls Attentional Semantics) and Logical-philosophical 
Semantics (put forward by authors such as Frege, Carnap, 
Tarski and Montague) and Structural Semantics (developed 
by authors such as Hjelmslev, Martinet, Greimas and Saus-
sure); Marchetti [47] highlights the difference between OS 
and the kind of cognitive semantics put forward by Leonard 
Talmy. The difference between the principles inspiring OS 
and the other kinds of semantics is also highlighted by Cec-
cato & Zonta [19], who describe the difference between what 
they call Operative Linguistics and Structural Linguistics, 
and by Vaccarino [48], who extensively deals with the rela-
tionships between his Constructivist Semantics and the other 
kinds of semantics. Oliva [49] describes the differences be-
tween Operative Linguistics and the other main linguistic 
theories. Finally, and in order to let the reader better under-
stand the theoretical innovations introduced by OS, it has to 
be noticed that OS differs substantially from the majority of 
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Ref. [50, 51], not only for the fact that it primarily deals 
with, and privileges, the semantic aspect of language over 
the syntactic one, but also because it offers a functional 
model that could be applied equally well to the comprehen-
sion stage of language as to the production stage of lan-
guage: in this sense, OS represents in our view an important 
improvement on , and integration to, current psycholinguistic 
studies.  
  As everybody knows, thought is not accessible with ob-
jective methods. It is accessible only subjectively through 
first-person perspective or, indirectly, by means of language. 
However, what is accessible is only the content of thought, 
not its mechanisms [1]. These mechanisms are shrouded in a 
deep mystery. Neural Science, despite its progresses, does 
not seem to be going to reveal this mystery (at least at pre-
sent). OS proposes to study these mechanisms by adopting 
some new fundamental theoretical presuppositions and a 
methodology, which is both introspective and linguistic. 
What OS allows us to study is the higher-order reflective 
linguistic thought, that is, what language is the expression of 
(for the sake of simplicity, from now on we shall use the 
expression “linguistic thought”). Linguistic thought, despite 
being just one kind of thought, is nevertheless the prevalent 
one, at least in the human being who has already learnt to 
speak. 
  We believe that the best way to introduce OS is exactly 
to consider language itself. So, let’s take a fragment of lan-
guage at random. For example, the beginning of one of the 
most famous books in the world: “Pinocchio”. 
  Once upon a time there was… 
   A king!  my small readers will say at once. 
  No, children, you are wrong. Once upon a time there was 
a piece of wood. 
  It was not a luxury wood, but a simple stack piece, one of 
those pieces we use to put in stoves and fireplaces in win-
ter to light fire and to heat rooms. 
  Every discrete element of language, that is, every word, 
designates at least one meaning (in many languages, many 
single words designate more than one meaning together, like, 
for instance, the basic meaning plus the plural). Therefore, 
each word designates one (or more) “atoms” of thought. 
Let’s ask ourselves what these “atoms” are, what their nature 
is. As far as their nature is concerned, first of all it seems that 
the meanings of words can be divided into at least three 
categories. 
1) In the passage we have chosen, there are words that, at 
first sight, seem to designate something physical (or, at 
least, mainly physical). These words are: “children”, 
“wood”, “stack”, “stoves”, “fireplaces”, “winter”, “[to] 
light”, “fire”, “[to] heat”, “rooms”. It is easy to realise 
that such words are so many that they make up probably 
most of the lexicon of any language. 
  If we consider this class more in depth, however, it does 
not seem homogeneous. Words such as “robin”, “bird” and 
“animal”, for instance, seem all to belong to this class, but 
certainly they express an increasing level of “abstraction” 
(therefore, something mental). Words such as personal pro-
nouns (“I”, “you” etc.), even if they undoubtedly designate 
something physical, are certainly more “abstract” than the 
names of the people they indicate in turn, for example “John 
Smith”. But, apart from these considerations, what we want 
to highlight is that there is a big class of words that have an 
evident and important reference to something physical. 
2)  Then, there is another class of words that indicates things 
that we can collectively call “psychical”, that is, feelings, 
emotions, moods etc. (love, hate, fear, anger etc.). These 
words are much less numerous (in the passage chosen 
there is not one of them). 
3)  Finally, there is a third class of words (or, in many lan-
guages, morphemes) that seem clearly different from the 
ones of the first two classes. In the passage chosen they 
are: the verbs “to be” and “to have”, the article “a”, the 
prepositions “upon”, “at”, “of”, “in”, “to”, the demon-
strative adjectives “that” and “those”, the negations “no” 
and “not”, the conjunctions “and” and “but”, the numer-
als “once” and “one”, the adverb “there” and the mor-
pheme “-s”, which indicates the plural. These words do 
not, or only minimally, seem to refer to anything physical 
or psychical. In the vocabulary of a language they are all 
the “grammatical” words, that is: 
-  prepositions (with, of, to, at, from, by, in, for, on, be-
tween, among etc.) and conjunctions (and, or, if, because, 
but etc.); 
-  interrogative-indefinite-relative pronouns or adjectives 
(who, what, which, whoever, whatever, whichever etc.); 
-  demonstrative adjectives and pronouns (this, that, other, 
the same etc.);  
-  main adverbs of place, time, manner etc. (here, there, 
where, when, how, why etc.); 
-  pronouns/adjectives of quantity (all, many, some, few 
etc.); 
-  negation (not, no, in- or un- as a prefix); 
-  numerals (one/first/once; two/second/twice; three/third 
etc.); 
-  fundamental verbs like “to be”, “to have”, “to get” etc.; 
- most morphemes of the large number of languages that 
have a more or less rich morphology (the ones which in-
dicate cases, in languages that have cases; the number of 
nouns and, in many languages, of adjectives; moods of 
the verb etc.). 
  In the passage chosen there are also two other words, 
“small” and “piece”, which, even if they are not properly 
considered “grammatical”, seem to be of the same kind 
(other examples can be: “big”, “high”, “low”, “beginning”, 
“end” etc.). 
  It is easy to realise that the number of items composing 
this class is quite limited (probably, they are more than the 
items of the second class, but surely much less than the ones 
of the first class), but, as a class, they are used in an ex-
tremely frequent way. If we choose samples of language at 
random, we will realise that this class is, in almost all cases, 
the main component of sentences and that it is absolutely 
indispensable in order to speak, that is, to make any speech 
up. Therefore, it is logical to consider it the fundamental 
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thought. We maintain that until we understand the nature of 
the meaning of these words, we shall not be able to under-
stand the nature and the structure of linguistic thought. 
  Well, what do these words and morphemes indicate? In 
some cases, it may seem that these words, even if they do not 
indicate something physical or psychical, indicate relation-
ships amongst physical things (in sentences such as “bottle 
of wine”, “he has a moustache” etc.) or features of physical 
things (in sentences such as “a large table”). Nevertheless, 
the same identical words may be used without problems in 
situations that have nothing to do with the physical world 
(for instance, we may say “stream of consciousness”, “to 
have an idea”, “a large number” etc.). Therefore, the answer 
to the question must be a different one. 
  Naturally, linguistics tried to give an answer to the afore-
said question [52, 53]. The solutions proposed so far seem 
unsatisfying. In order to realize this, it is sufficient to exam-
ine the definitions of these words that can be found in dic-
tionaries. They use tautologies (for example, “not” is defined 
as “negation”) or false synonyms (for example, “to have” 
would mean “to possess, to own”, “to keep”, “to get, to ob-
tain”, etc.) or they send us from one word to another word 
and then back (for example, the verb “to look for” is defined 
by means of the verb “to find” and vice versa). As far as 
prepositions are concerned, they are generally said to have a 
lot of meanings, that is, they would indicate many kinds of 
relationship (such as place, time, manner, cause, means or 
instrument, company or union, origin etc.). It is easy to ob-
ject that it seems improbable that words, which occur so fre-
quently and are so indispensable, have so many meanings. It 
is more likely that prepositions have only one, more general 
meaning (that is why it is so difficult to determine it), and 
that the many relationships grammar speaks about are only 
specifications, just introduced by grammar itself, which are 
included in this more general meaning: for example, it is 
more likely that the preposition “with” does not designate 
the relationship of company or union, manner, cause etc., but 
something more general in which the relationship of com-
pany or union, manner, cause etc. are included. In fact, sev-
eral linguists themselves admit, more or less openly, that the 
definitions given of these words are unsatisfying [52, 53]. 
  A completely new solution to this problem comes from 
OS. This kind of approach was developed, in the 50s-70s of 
last century, by S. Ceccato (1914-1997). Two of the authors 
of this paper, Benedetti [21-23, 38, 54-56] and Marchetti 
[20, 24, 25, 57-60], have deeply modified and developed it 
(because of this, they use a name that is different from the 
original ones such as Operational Linguistics and Opera-
tional Methodology used by Ceccato). The fundamental 
thesis of OS is that these words designate sequences of men-
tal operations (the name “Operational Semantics” derives 
from this), amongst which the ones of attention play a key 
role. 
  Ceccato called “mental categories” these sequences of 
mental operations, an expression that is also adopted by OS. 
We must notice the fact that this use of the expression “cate-
gory” is completely different from the use made in Cognitive 
Psychology and Linguistics. Typically, Cognitive Psychol-
ogy and Linguistics use the expression “category” to high-
light the fact that, since many objects of the physical world 
share common features, but are not identical, we create 
classes by means of a mental process of abstraction [61-64]. 
On the contrary, OS calls “mental categories” the meanings 
of the words such as the ones we listed at point (3). 
  As we pointed out, according to OS, mental categories 
are made up of mental operations, which were called elemen-
tal mental operations by Ceccato. Also in this case, it must 
be highlighted that the use by OS of the expression “elemen-
tal mental operations” differs from the use made in cognitive 
sciences: while for the former it denotes only “elemental 
operations that make up mental categories”, for the latter it 
has a wider meaning, denoting also some other kind of op-
erations that may be considered “elemental”, such as, for 
example, basic operations of perception. For this reason, in 
this paper we shall use, as much as possible, the more spe-
cific expression “elemental operations that make up mental 
categories”, or its acronym EOMC. 
  Below we shall try to summarise very briefly how, ac-
cording to OS, mental categories are formed starting from 
EOMC and how linguistic thought is made up starting from 
mental categories, so that the reader can understand the ex-
periments proposed in the last part of this paper. 
  Ceccato hypothesized that attention can only be in two 
states (attention waiting for something to be focused on, and 
attention focusing on something) and that the structure of the 
mental categories is made up of the various possible combi-
nations of a progressively increasing number (2, 3, 4, etc.) of 
these two states. This hypothesis gave poor and controversial 
results in the analysis of mental categories. Nevertheless, 
Ceccato gave also some other sketched descriptions of the 
structure of several mental categories. Starting from these 
descriptions, Benedetti [22, 23] and Marchetti [20] have pro-
posed a set of EOMC that is more complex than Ceccato’s, 
and have consequently put forward new analyses of the fun-
damental mental categories. 
  Benedetti and Marchetti’s proposals include both opera-
tions of attention and other kinds of operations, most of 
which have been repeatedly described in Cognitive Psychol-
ogy. Starting from the seminal works by James [65] and Ri-
bot [66], attention has been variously analysed and de-
scribed: Posner [67, 68] and Posner and Cohen [69], for ex-
ample, specifically describe the operation of orienting atten-
tion and the three elemental operations composing such an 
operation: engaging on a target, disengaging from it, and 
shifting to a new target; Jonides [70] describes the way at-
tention can be focused at variable levels of size, being set 
either widely across a display of objects or narrowly to the 
size of a single object; La Berge [71] analyses how attention 
can be focused at variable levels of intensity; La Berge [72] 
describes how attention can be sustained or maintained for 
variable, though limited, amounts of time; Pashler [73] de-
scribes the different involvement of attention during the per-
ceptual processing stage and more central, post-perceptual 
stages. The works by Braga-Illa [74-76] and Denis [77] de-
scribe in an extensive and quite exhaustive way the bulk of 
studies on representation in various scientific fields (psy-
chology, sociology, logic, artificial intelligence, etc.). As to 
memory and its various forms and characteristics, see Bad-
deley [78], Baddeley and Hitch [79], Cowan [80, 81], Miller 
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  The new idea we propose is that by means of these opera-
tions we can account for the meaning of the words listed at 
point (3), hence for the nature and structure of linguistic 
thought. The list of the EOMC that Benedetti proposes is the 
following. 
1. Operation of Attentional Focalisation (AF) 
  This operation produces the “selection”, or “highlight-
ing” of its object with respect to all the rest [65]. AF can 
widely vary in extension (therefore, we can focus our atten-
tion on an object, a part of it, or several objects). The focus 
of attention can move from an object to another one, or from 
a part of the field to which it is applied to another one. 
Moreover, AF can be maintained for variable, though lim-
ited, amounts of time. Attention can be applied not only to 
objects, but also to the so-called “maps” [38]. The main 
maps are the spatial map and the temporal map, that is, our 
mental representations of space and time. In this way it is 
possible to account for the structure of the mental categories 
related to space and to time (for example: “place”, “where”, 
“here”, “there”, “high”, “short”, “wide”, “narrow”, “left”, 
“right”, “now”, “before”, “after”, “during”, “when” etc.). 
(For the importance of attentional selection in the construc-
tion of space, see also Carstensen [85-87]). 
2. Operation of Attentional Discarding (AD) 
  By means of this operation we exclude or discard some-
thing, keeping anyway in mind the fact that attention was 
focused on it before (this operation is different from simply 
stopping focusing our attention on an object in order to focus 
on something else). 
3. Operation of Representation (R) 
  The operation of representation is the act of thinking 
about something which is not present. This is what we do 
when, hearing for example a word, we pass to its meaning, 
which was previously memorised. Sometimes the formation 
of a mental image of the object follows the understanding of 
the meaning. 
4. Operation of Comparison (C) 
  When this operation is performed, we compare two (or 
more) objects that are focused by attention and borne in 
mind. Even though comparison implies operations of AF and 
presence keeping, we believe that it has to be considered as a 
separate function. This is the reason why we call it “extra-
attentional” operation. 
5. Presence Keeping (PK)  
  In common language, this operation is referred to as 
“bearing (or keeping) something in mind”. This operation is 
surely strictly related with the well-known concept devel-
oped by Cognitive Psychology of “working (or active) mem-
ory” [78-81, 83, 84]. We can sense this operation very well 
when, looking at two distinct objects, A and B, firstly we 
name them separately, and then we say “A and B”: in the 
latter case, we focus our attention on A and we keep it pre-
sent while focusing our attention on B. 
6. Operations of Memory (MO) 
  Memory surely plays a key role in our mental life: by 
means of it, we fix and recall both brief and long-term 
memories continuously. Apart from all of this, Benedetti 
thinks that memory operations are part of the structure of 
some mental categories [22, 23, 38]. Therefore, we list them 
amongst the basic mental operations that make up mental 
categories. Also these memory operations are distinct from 
the ones of attention. 
  As we have said, our hypothesis is that the meanings of 
the “grammatical” words, which represent the majority of 
mental categories, are sequences of EOMC. Let’s briefly 
consider some simple examples
2. 
  In the case of the conjunction and, as already mentioned, 
we focus our attention (AF) on something (say A) and we 
keep it present (PK) while focusing our attention on some-
thing else, B. In this way B is “tied” to A. In the case of the 
conjunction  or, firstly we focus our attention (AF) on an 
object A and then we discard (AD) it in order to focus the 
attention on another one, B. Therefore, A is excluded when B 
is taken into consideration: an alternative between the two 
objects is so created. 
  In the case of the preposition with, first we focus our 
attention on an object A, then the attentional focalisation also 
extends to another object B, because B is in such a relation-
ship with A that attention is induced to focus A and B as a 
unity, together. For example, we say, “bottle with cork” 
when the cork is in the neck of the bottle. We have to notice 
that this analysis explains very well the fact that in many 
languages this preposition is used to express both the rela-
tionship of company or union between two things and the 
one of means or instrument between an activity and an ob-
ject. Indeed, both when we say, for example, “cup with han-
dle” and when we say, for example, “to write with a pen”, 
what appears to our attention is an object which is in such a 
relationship with another one that our attention is induced to 
focus on both objects together, as a unity. In fact, the handle 
is joined to the cup and therefore as long as we look at the 
cup we also see the handle; and as long as we watch the ac-
tion of writing we see the pen. 
  Also in the case of the meaning of the genitive case (ex-
pressed in English with the preposition “of”, the possessive 
case or word order) we refer to a situation in which an object 
is in such a relationship with another object that attention is 
induced to focus also on the latter. However, when using the 
genitive case, we keep mentally present such a relationship 
between the two objects, but then we focus attention only on 
the second object. For example, if, looking at a man with a 
black hat on his head, we say “there is a man with a hat” and 
then add “the man’s hat is black”, in both cases we keep pre-
sent the fact that the hat is in such a relationship with the 
man that attention is induced to focus on both objects (the 
hat touches the man), but when using the genitive case atten-
tion then focuses only on the hat (in order to talk about the 
hat and say that it is black). This analysis explains very well 
the fact that the genitive case is used when between two ob-
jects there are relationships such as: possession (“John's 
car”), work/author (“picture of Raphael”), part/whole (“the 
branches of the tree”), belonging to a group (“a friend of 
mine”), feature/object (“the colour of the dress”) etc. 
                                                 
2 The most important mental categories have been identified by using: the list of “se-
mantic primitives” of “Natural Semantic Metalanguage” [39-46], the Swadesh list (a 
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 The  category  of  negation (“not”, “no”, “in-” or “un-” as 
a prefix) indicates the discarding (AD) of the representation 
(R) of a meaning. If, for example, we say, “John’s car is not 
red”, we mean that the representation of the meaning “red” 
concerning John’s car (a representation that was prompted 
by a previous event, such as for example the question: “Does 
John have a red car?”) is discarded. 
 The  categories  which, what and who indicate that atten-
tion is firstly focused (AF) on a group of two or more ele-
ments, which are considered equal (C), and then focused on 
one of them while discarding (AD) the remaining objects, 
bearing in mind (PK) the origin of the first one. If, for exam-
ple, we are looking at some books, and someone asks us 
“which book do you want?”, we will realize that after having 
focused our attention on the group of books, we focus on one 
of them while discarding the others, but bearing in mind the 
fact that the book chosen comes from a group of similar ele-
ments (that is, a group of books).  
  The category “how much” is produced by means of the 
operation of counting, that is, by means of a series of opera-
tions of focalization of attention (AF), one following the 
other, on each object of a group of objects considered equal 
(C), bearing in mind (PK) the preceding objects each time 
we add a new one. Each successive repetition is named by a 
different name (these are the single numbers: “one”, “two”, 
“three” etc.). The word number indicates each one of these 
repetitions without specifying which one, while how much 
indicates that attention must be focused on the final result of 
counting. The category of plural instead indicates that we 
have simply carried out subsequent attentional focalizations 
on things considered equal, but without associating a con-
ventional name of a progressive series (that is, a number) to 
each of them. For example, if, when looking at a scene in 
which there are an apple, a pear, a plum and a peach, we say 
“there are four fruits”, this happens because, firstly we have 
considered the apple, the pear, the plum and the peach as 
elements that are equal (that is, as “fruits”); secondly, we 
have focused our attention on one of them associating a con-
ventional name (“one”) to it; thirdly, while bearing in mind 
this, we have focused our attention on a new element associ-
ating another conventional name (“two”) to it; and so on. If 
instead we say, “there are some fruits”, we have carried out 
the same operations, but without the association of a pro-
gressive series of conventional names. 
  We conclude this brief series of examples of analyses of 
mental categories with two verbs: “to have” and “to get”. 
Their meanings are so general that dictionaries usually try to 
capture them by defining each entry with a very long list of 
verbs: for example, “to get” would mean “to obtain”, “to 
receive”, “to understand”, “to become” etc. However, these 
lists are nothing else but collections of more “specialised” 
verbs whose meanings are included in the more general 
meanings of “to have” and “to get”. The meanings of “to 
have” and “to get” are so general because both these verbs 
designate the same relationship as the one designated by the 
preposition “with” (first attention focuses on an object A, 
then attentional focalization is extended to another object B 
because the latter is in such a relationship with A that atten-
tion is induced to focus A and B as a unity, together). The 
difference with the preposition “with” is that, in the case of 
these two verbs, as in all verbs, we see the situation from the 
temporal point of view, which entails that we keep our atten-
tion continuously or repeatedly focused on the situation, and 
feel its incremental work [88]. In the case of the verb to 
have, the result is something static. For example, “that man 
has a moustache” means that when we focus our attention on 
his face we also see a moustache and this remains constant 
throughout time. On the contrary, in the case of the verb to 
get, the result is something dynamic. For example, “to get 
the pen” means that our hand comes in such a relationship 
with the pen that if we look at the hand we also see the pen 
(the pen is in the hand), while before there was not such a 
relationship. 
  Now that we have introduced some analyses of mental 
categories, we can explain how, according to our theory, 
mental categories allow us to produce linguistic thought. 
Let’s consider the following words: “apple”, “pear”, “red”, 
“and”, “or”, “with”. Let’s try to represent each of the mean-
ings of these words in an isolated way. This is easy for the 
first three words, while for the other three we have a clear 
sense of “incompleteness”. We sense very well that these 
words require something that precedes them and something 
else that follows them. In other words, their function is to 
“tie” two other elements to each other. According to our the-
ory, linguistic thought is made up of two fundamental kinds 
of elements: 
1) correlators 
2) correlata 
 Correlators are the elements that have the specific func-
tion of tying the other elements of linguistic thought. They 
are the mental categories designated by prepositions, con-
junctions and some of the so-called cases (genitive, dative 
etc.), in languages that have cases (in languages that have no 
cases their meanings are expressed by means of preposi-
tions). Correlata are the elements that are “tied” by a corre-
lator. According to OS, even though the meanings of isolated 
words (such as “apple”) are a kind of thought, there is actual 
linguistic thought only when we “tie” or “correlate” more 
than one meaning to each other, that is, when we say, for 
example, “apple and pear”, “red apple”, etc. 
  The two correlata that are tied by a correlator are called 
“first correlatum” and “second correlatum”, respectively, 
according to the order in which attention focuses on them. 
The whole structure so formed is called correlation or corre-
lational triad and we represent it graphically in the following 
way: 
 
correlator 
first correlatum  second correlatum 
 
  In the case of the example “pear and apple”, we shall 
have this correlation: 
 
and 
pear apple 
 
  Besides prepositions, conjunctions and some cases (in 
languages that have cases), there is another correlator, which 
is extremely important. Its structure is the same as the one of 
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in mind while attention focuses on B), but in this case A and 
B do not remain separate, but they “combine” together. This 
happens because A and B are in some way complementary. 
For example, A is an object that can exist on its own and B a 
possible feature of it (correlation substantive-adjective); or B 
is what may happen to A in time (correlation subject-verb); 
or A is an activity and B something the activity can be per-
formed on (correlation verb-object); etc. We represent the 
implicit correlator graphically by means of a  horizontal  bar: 
  Since this correlator is, as we can easily understand, the 
most used of correlators, it is convenient not to express it 
with a word and to indicate its presence either simply putting 
the two words that it correlates one after the other (when this 
is possible) or using marks of the words (English has very 
few marks of this kind, but many languages have several of 
them: for instance, in the Italian sentence “bottiglia di vino 
nuova”, which means “new bottle of wine”, the two “a” that 
are underlined are marks of the feminine gender, which indi-
cate that the adjective nuova, “new”, has to be related to bot-
tiglia, “bottle”, not to vino, “wine”). Because this correlator 
is not expressed by a word, it has been called “implicit corre-
lator”. Nevertheless, it is really implicit only when no lin-
guistic element (whether word order or word marks) ex-
presses it, that is, only when it can be inferred by the general 
sense of the sentence. For example, in the two expressions 
"empty whisky bottle" and "Scotch whisky bottle" only the 
sense of the sentence tells us which noun the two adjectives 
"empty" and "Scotch" refer to. 
  According to OS, correlation is the basic unit of linguis-
tic thought. Linguistic thought in fact is a “network” formed 
by correlations (correlational network) in which a correla-
tion acts as a correlatum of another correlation. Therefore, 
the sentence “John reads books and magazines”, for instance, 
has the following structure of thought: 
(the dotted line that starts from the line that separates the two 
lower boxes of a correlation and that ends with the symbol 
“•” placed in one of the two lower boxes of another correla-
tion indicates that the first correlation is one of the correlata 
of the second correlation). We call this theory correlational 
theory of linguistic thought. Obviously, it is also a linguistic 
theory, but the facts that a) it is above all a theory about the 
nature and structure of thought; b) it makes a clear distinc-
tion between correlators and correlata; c) it considers linguis-
tic thought a non-linear “network”, based on units necessar-
ily composed of three elements —one element that ties and 
two elements that are tied (even if sometimes the former is 
not expressed) make it a linguistic theory that is deeply 
different from all other linguistic theories. 
  The set of hypotheses forming OS, which we have very 
briefly summarised here, have been put forward through 
methods of both an introspective and a linguistic kind 
(analysis of the contexts in which words expressing mental 
categories occur). These very same linguistic data also al-
lowed us to verify the validity of the analyses carried out. 
The study of the gestures that sometimes accompany the 
verbal expression of mental categories provided further evi-
dence for our hypotheses [89]. Unfortunately, up to now 
there was no real opportunity to relate OS theory to a bio-
logically based framework, which describes the properties of 
reflective consciousness at the neurophysiological level of 
brain organization, and to test OS’s hypotheses by means of 
neurobiological methods. OA is a neurobiological theory, 
recently developed by two neuroscientists – the Fingelkurts 
brothers, which has a putative correspondence with the intro-
spective-linguistic OS theory by Benedetti and Marchetti and 
offers a methodological way to test the common predictions 
of both theoretical frameworks. 
  Summarising, the fundamental theses/predictions of OS, 
which make it a deeply different semantic theory from the 
others, are the following. 
1)  According to the wide and in-depth approach of Wierz-
bicka [40, 41], most words of a language can be defined 
by means of words of the same language, but there is a 
core of fundamental words (which Wierzbicka calls "se-
mantic primitives") whose meaning cannot be defined by 
means of words. This central core is mainly made up of 
the "grammatical" words. According to OS, we can ac-
count for the meaning of these fundamental words only 
by "getting out of language". In fact, the fundamental 
thesis of OS is that the meanings of these words (which 
OS calls "mental categories") are sequences of elemental 
mental operations, amongst which the ones of attention 
play a key role. These elemental mental operations 
(which OS calls "elemental mental operations which 
make up mental categories", or EOMC) have been re-
peatedly described in Cognitive Psychology. The predic-
tion of OS that the grammatical words are constituted by 
sequences of EOMC can be experimentally tested and 
ascertained thanks to the methods and techniques devel-
oped by OA. In this work we propose some experiments 
aiming at verifying such a prediction. 
2) Although linguistics has often, more or less explicitly, 
considered the aforesaid words (or morphemes) as having 
a complex meaning and polysemous (think, for example, 
of the prepositions), these words are unique and children 
learn them very early. OS proposes a holistic and or-
ganic theory of the meaning of these words where they 
are considered, in agreement with these two facts, as hav-
ing a simple and (substantially) unique meaning. This 
meaning is simple because it is given by sequences of ba-
sic mental operations, that is, lies at the most general and 
de-contextualized possible level. That is, words such as 
"and", "or", "with", "of", etc can relate any kind of things 
(physical, psychical, mental things) to each other because 
they do not designate a specific physical or psychical or 
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a particular way of mental operating where attention 
plays the key role. Furthermore, this meaning is (as a 
principle) unique (as well as the word that expresses it is 
unique) because these words do not express, contrary to 
what has being traditionally generally maintained, the 
various particular relationships that there are between 
the things these words relate (for example, in the case of 
the preposition "with", the relationship of company or 
union between two things, the relationship between an 
activity and its instrument, etc), but something more gen-
eral where these relationships are included. As we can 
see, OS proposes a theory of the meaning of these fun-
damental words that agrees perfectly with two incontest-
able facts: each of these words, despite its various sup-
posed meanings, is unique and all these words are basic 
elements that children learn very early. On the contrary, 
linguistic tradition has generally maintained that these 
words are very polysemous (that is a very improbable 
thesis, in our opinion) and their meaning is very complex 
(this disagrees sharply with the fact that these words are 
amongst the first that children learn to use perfectly). The 
prediction of OS concerning the univocity of the gram-
matical words can also be experimentally verified. 
3)  According to Ceccato and Zonta [19] and Vaccarino [90], 
EOMC are mainly represented by attentional states and 
memory. Contrary to such a hypothesis, OS predicts that 
also some other elemental mental operations are in-
volved. This prediction can be experimentally ascertained 
through the neurobiological approach of OA. 
There are other theses/predictions of OS that we cannot take 
into consideration in an article such as this. They are exten-
sively discussed in Benedetti’s work ([23], pp. 232-235; 
[38], pp. 21-24). Here we simply mention them: 
4)  OS proposes a simple and unique definition of grammati-
cal terms such as "noun", "subject", "object", etc. It is a 
well-known fact that the definition of these terms has al-
ways been problematic. The definition provided by OS 
works perfectly in all cases where the various traditional 
definitions fail. 
5)  OS proposes an answer to the problem of whether human 
linguistic ability is innate or acquired. This answer 
(which is different from the traditional ones and interme-
diate between them) agrees perfectly with the available 
data. 
6) OS, following its presuppositions, proposes a theory 
about the main reason for the difference between human 
language and animal communication. 
7)  OS proposes a theory about the linguistic universals that 
could steer the research in this field in a new direction. 
OPERATIONAL ARCHITECTONICS (OA) 
  As the details of the OA theory are beyond the scope of 
this paper, here we will only concentrate on some essential 
aspects which are important for the current discussion (pri-
mary references for OA theory are Fingelkurts and 
Fingelkurts [26-78, 30, 34-36]. In brief, the OA theory as-
sumes that the level of organization at which cognition, phe-
nomenal consciousness, and, in particular, reflective con-
sciousness (in the form of linguistic thoughts) reside might 
be the highly organized macro-level electrophysiological 
phenomena (metastable operational modules) in the brain, 
which are realized by the coordinated electrical activity (op-
erational synchrony) of many neuronal assemblies dispersed 
throughout the brain [26, 28]; for a similar view, see Revon-
suo [91]. The activity of these neuronal assemblies is “hid-
den” in the complex nonstationary structure of the biopoten-
tial brain field – i.e., EEG (for the review, see Ref. [27, 34, 
36]. At first glance the OA theory has some similarities with 
other important related theoretical frameworks, such as, for 
example, Dynamic Core [92], Resonant Cell Assembly [93], 
Global Workspace [94] theories, Framework for Conscious-
ness [95] and Philosophy of Mind [96]. However, the OA 
theory has several crucial and important differences from all 
of them (for some argumentation, see Ref. [36]). 
  Let us briefly observe the main postulates of the OA 
framework: 
1)  One, and probably the most important one, of the differ-
ent operations of the neuron is to process the electric currents 
which arrive on its dendrites and transmit the resulting elec-
trical current to other connected neurons using its axon. This 
“blind” neurophysiological operation is, at the same time, the 
elemental physical operation of the brain (Table 1). Such 
operations have a fully neurophysiological ontology and they 
are completely NONconscious phenomena, which, according 
to Searle [97], have no mental/subjective ontology whatso-
ever.  
  The single neurons (highly distributed along the cortex) 
can quickly become associated (or dis-associated) by syn-
chronizing their operations and giving rise to transient neu-
ronal assemblies. Here the emphasis is put not so much on 
the anatomical neural networks (as they are conceived in 
classical concepts [98], but rather on the functional interrela-
tions of brain cells – transient neuronal assemblies [99]. 
Each of these functional assemblies represent/execute dis-
crete  elemental cognitive operations which process/present 
different attributes of objects, environmental scenes, or some 
other stimuli, including phenomenal objects of subjective 
experience [30, 35]. Thus, functional neuronal assemblies 
support discrete elemental brain operations, some of which 
may have already phenomenal/subjective ontology in addi-
tion to the neurophysiological one (Table 1). 
  It has been shown that such neuronal assemblies have a 
transient dynamical existence (i.e. a functional life-span), 
which usually persists during short (millisecond) time 
intervals [100, 101]. These intervals represent the time 
needed for the neuronal assembly to execute/present a 
particular operation. It has been shown experimentally and in 
computational models that such intervals are characterized 
by fixed states of neuronal assemblies which are separated 
by rapid transitions [102]. Within the rapid transitional 
period the whole neuronal assembly can swiftly be 
rearranged [103].  
  At the EEG level these operations of the neuronal assem-
blies are reflected in the periods of the EEG quasi-stationary 
activity within different frequency ranges, registered from 
different brain locations (for reviews, see Fingelkurts and 
Fingelkurts [26, 27, 36] and Kaplan et al. [104]). 
2)  The temporal synchronization of different brain opera-
tions executed by different local neuronal assemblies simul-
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of brain abstractness – metastable brain states [26-28]. 
These states are metastable because the neuronal assemblies 
which constitute them perform/have different opera-
tions/functions and each does its own inherent “job” (thus 
expressing the autonomous tendency), while still being, at 
the same time, temporarily entangled among each other (and 
thus expressing the coordinated activity) in order to execute 
a common complex operation or a complex cognitive act of a 
higher functional hierarchy [27]. As has been proposed by 
Kelso [105], metastability relates exactly to the phenomenon 
of a constant interplay between the autonomous and the in-
terdependent tendency (see also Ref. [106]). 
  Quantitatively such phenomenon is assessed through the 
measure of synchronization of EEG segments (structural 
synchrony) obtained from different brain locations [26]. 
These metastable brain states or functional Operational 
Modules (OM), as we name them, may underlie the realiza-
tion of brain complex macrooperations (Table 1) – cognitive 
percepts, phenomenal objects, and reflective thoughts within 
the operational space-time continuum [30, 35]. 
  The key point here is that OMs have a more complex 
structure than the operations which constitute them. How-
ever, OMs carry less fine-grained information, since only the 
essential information for the emergent cognitive percept, 
phenomenal object, or reflective thought is preserved. For 
example, in the case of a visual perception, a large amount of 
information (intensity of the stimulus, lightness, colour, 
shape, size, proximity, texture and so on) is represented and 
processed by different neuronal assemblies, but at the higher 
level of abstractness (metastable OMs) the phenomenal im-
age of an ‘airplane’, for instance, is presented. Thus, in ac-
cordance with the information theory of Shannon [107], the 
operational synchrony process ‘abstracts out’ the informa-
tion carried by OMs, meaning that OMs are not sensitive to 
the original raw (neurophysiological) data anymore, but only 
to the spatial-temporal pattern of activation that is embodied 
in the involved neuronal assemblies. So, the information that 
remains is only an abstraction of certain aspects of the origi-
nal data, including physical (non-mental) processes in the 
brain. 
  The sequence of these metastable OMs thus may repre-
sent the stream of consciousness (for details see the second 
part of Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts [26]). The main idea is 
that the structure of the electrical brain field (EEG), the 
structure of cognition, and the phenomenal structure of con-
sciousness, all have the same organization: the succession of 
discrete and relatively stable periods (metastable OMs, cog-
nitive acts, or thoughts, correspondingly) separated by rapid 
transitive processes (abrupt changes between OMs, cognitive 
acts or thoughts, correspondingly)[30].  
3) OMs (being by themselves the result of synchronized 
operations going on in distributed and local brain structures) 
could be operationally synchronized between each other (on 
a new time scale), thus forming more abstract and more 
complex OM which constitute new and more integrated phe-
nomenal experience (Table 1; see Ref. [28, 36]. We argue 
that each of the new OMs is not just a sum of simpler OMs. 
Rather, the more complex OM is most naturally a union of 
abstractions about simpler OMs. Complexity hierarchy en-
ables the brain to build complex phenomenal patterns/objects 
from primitive ones so that the semantic value of the com-
plex representation is determined by, and dependent on, the 
semantic values of the primitives [28]. Such interpretation is 
consistent with some ideas established already by the early 
philosopher Thomas Aquinas (reprint [108]), who concluded 
that single events in the material world are not knowable, 
and that knowledge comes only through abstraction and gen-
eralization from the “phantasmata” of raw sensory impacts. 
  In the end, such a process may lead to the generation of 
the most complex mental state, whereby visual, auditory, 
perceptual, bodily, emotional, cognitive, and other subjective 
experiences are unified. This state may well correspond to 
the personal “self” or even to a broader unified experience 
such as that of “subject” (for the distinction between self and 
subject, see Ref. [1]). Since also at this top level of abstract-
ness (reflective consciousness) we do not yet have direct 
access to the brain processes, this subjective (conscious) 
experience seems so strange and mysterious to us [30]. 
4) Also the reverse process is possible – when a complex 
phenomenal pattern, object, or reflective thought (repre-
sented in the brain by complex OM) guided by attention is 
decomposed into several simpler phenomenal parts (OMs), 
which in their turn may be further decomposed into even 
simpler ones [27, 28]. The price for this decomposition is a 
Table 1.  Hierarchy of Brain/Mind Operations and their Relations to Different Levels of Brain Organization 
   Description Within the Operational Architectonics Framework 
  
single neuron 
single neuronal 
assembly 
single OM (several 
sinchronized 
neuronal assemblies) 
… 
complex OM (integrated several 
simple OMs) 
Physiological   elemental  complex  more complex  …  very complex 
Cognitive   n.a.  elemental  complex  …  very complex 
B
r
a
i
n
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
Higher-order reflective 
thought  
n.a.  n.a.  elemental  …  very complex 
n.a. - Non applicable            
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narrowly focused attention and consequently the focused 
reflective conscious state [1].  
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN OS AND OA 
  It is a fact that human language production and its phe-
nomenal self-presentation are caused by neuronal activity 
and any speech signal necessarily activates neurons in the 
brains of listeners when being perceived [6]. Therefore, there 
should be a link between the structure of the electromagnetic 
brain field (EEG/MEG) and the structure of the higher-order 
reflective (linguistic) thought, whereby both of them, al-
though seemingly worlds apart, must be intimately con-
nected and mirrored in each other. However, owing to the 
enormous complexity of language and the brain functional 
structures, the subject of the putative correspondence be-
tween linguistic mental and neurophysiological brain levels 
has not been yet addressed directly.  
  At the same time, developments of recent years in the 
understanding of psycholinguistic [7, 20-23, 47, 54-56, 59, 
60, 109, 110] and brain [6, 26, 27, 31, 36, 101, 104, 106] 
functioning have enabled researchers to identify and eventu-
ally to start experimentally to study the parallels between 
linguistic and brain levels within the same theoretical and 
methodological framework. To do so, the explanation should 
be made within the terms of a phenomenon that is shared by 
both organizational levels of the brain (phenomenologi-
cal/mental and neurophysiological/biological) [30, 37]. 
  We believe that the concept of “operation” is the re-
quired shared fundamental reference which provides us with 
a starting point for the conceptual integration and a unified 
research program. Both, the material neurophysiological 
organization that characterizes the brain and the informa-
tional order that characterizes the mind necessarily involve 
such events as operations at their cores. Generally, operation 
is broadly defined as the state of being in effect (for further 
discussion, see Ref. [27, 28]. It should be stressed that this is 
so regardless of whether this process is concep-
tual/phenomenal or physical/biological. In fact, everything 
which can be represented by a process is an operation. Un-
derstanding of the operation as a process and considering its 
combinatorial nature, seems especially well suited for de-
scribing and studying the mechanisms of how information 
about the objective physical entities of the external world 
can be integrated, and how unified/coherent phenomenal 
objects or thoughts can be presented in the internal subjec-
tive world by means of entities of distributed neuronal brain 
assemblies. It is only at this level of integration (through 
functional isomorphism principle) [26, 34, 37] that we may 
hope to relate and bridge the gap between linguistic level on 
the one hand and empirical evidence of its brain implementa-
tion on the other [30]. 
  Up to date there are only two theoretical frameworks that 
explicitly aim to describe, measure and model the mind (OS 
theory) and brain (OA theory) operations involved in the 
complex human higher-order reflective consciousness 
(thoughts) which is governed by the brain.  
  According to OS theory, reflective/linguistic thought is 
always operational (made up of operations) and OS explic-
itly defines the structure of linguistic thought. This structure 
is characterized by correlators, correlata, and by a hierarchy 
of operations of increasing complexity. Likewise, in OA 
theory the brain functioning is also always operational (made 
up of operations) and the structure of the brain functioning is 
also characterized by a hierarchy of operations of increasing 
complexity and connections between these different opera-
tions. The basic idea is that the synchronized brain activity 
produced by local neuronal assemblies is linked to the re-
quired operation (or operational act) and only those local 
activities evoked by common objects, scenes, or tasks are 
bound together in dynamically formed metastable OMs [30, 
36]. However, the whole level of OS description (elemental 
operations, categories, maps, and correlational networks) 
corresponds to the level of OMs (or set of them) of different 
complexity within the OA theory (see Table 1).  
  Below we shall propose some possible experiments 
which can shed light on the correspondence between the 
main postulates of OS and OA theories. The results of such 
experiments will either support the initial hypotheses and 
ideas, or not (and then the theoretical tenets should be modi-
fied). Altogether, this research program should give us a 
profoundly improved understanding of the complex linguis-
tic thought processes, their putative modular architecture and 
their neurobiological implementation. 
EXPERIMENTS AIMING TO TEST A PUTATIVE 
CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN OS AND OA 
  As we have seen, according to OS, linguistic thought has 
two components: 1) representations or perceptions of physi-
cal and psychical things; 2) mental categories. Also the rep-
resentations (or perceptions) of physical or psychical things 
can be products of operations. For example, the perception 
of a visual object seems to need the integration of features 
such as form, colour, movement etc., which are processed in 
a parallel way in distinct brain regions. The OMs identified 
by OA could be either the expression of binding operations 
of this kind, or of other kinds of operations. Nevertheless, 
OMs (or some of them) could be the expression of higher-
level operations, such as the basic operations of linguistic 
thought theorized by OS. In this section, we shall try to out-
line some experiments that could reveal the putative corre-
spondences between OS and OA. 
  As we have seen, OS hypothesises the existence of three 
operational levels in linguistic thought, which can be related 
to OMs of different complexity in the OA framework: 
1) the level of the basic or elemental mental operations 
(EOMC) of linguistic thought, which could correspond to 
the simple OMs; 
2) the level of mental categories, which are made up of 
EOMC. In some cases, we have hypothesised that we do 
not apply the EOMC to objects, but to spatial and tempo-
ral “maps”, that is, our mental representations of space 
and time, respectively, so that we could also look for 
something that corresponds to these “maps” or to their 
activation. This level could correspond to the complex 
OMs; 
3)  the level of correlational network (correlata tied by par-
ticular mental categories, correlators). This level could 
correspond to the consequent set of complex and simple 
OMs (that is, the “very complex OMs” of Table 1). 
  Therefore, we can look for correspondences between OS 
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separately, taking the set of EOMC proposed by Benedetti 
and Ceccato’s correlational model as a first starting point for 
the search of possible correspondences between OS and OA. 
1) Elemental Operations 
a) Operation of Attentional Focalization (AF) 
  To look for correspondences between the OMs and this 
operation, is obviously fundamental. Nevertheless, at this 
level we could encounter at least two kinds of difficulties. 
The first one is related to the fact that, when we pay atten-
tion, we pay attention to something. Obviously, in our study 
we must consider only very simple, physical situations. In 
human beings, the predominant sense is sight and we tend to 
use sight when we are in front of physical situations. The 
fact is that when we pay attention to the visual features of an 
object, that is, when we look at it, we perform a very com-
plex perceptual activity, which very probably needs the inte-
gration of the activity of distinct nervous structures that 
process in a parallel way the information concerning shape, 
colour, movement etc [111, 112]. Obviously, all this com-
plex activity is reflected in the electrical activity recorded by 
the EEG. Therefore, it would be necessary to somehow sepa-
rate as much as possible the operation of attentional focaliza-
tion per se from this complex activity.  
  The second kind of difficulty is due to the fact that, as 
Cognitive Psychology shows, the operation of attentional 
focalization can be divided in turn into at least three elemen-
tal operations: a) engaging on a target b) disengaging from it 
c) and then shifting to a new target [67-69]. If we accept the 
hypothesis that there is a correspondence between simple 
OMs and EOMC, we have to expect that these three sub-
operations will have some correspondence in the structure of 
simple OMs. We also have to notice that the execution of 
these three sub-operations is surely influenced by some other 
factors. That is, the acts of paying attention to a certain ob-
ject rather than to another, of disengaging from it, and of 
shifting to some new object rather than to another may be 
induced either by an explicit act of will of the subject, by 
some external sensory stimuli, or by some linguistic input. 
Therefore, given the aforesaid hypothesis, we might expect 
that these various factors will also be reflected in OMs’ pa-
rameters/features. 
  In order to overcome these difficulties, a first approach 
would recommend comparing the bioelectrical activity of a 
subject (indexed by OMs) in a condition of complete rest 
with the one of a subject who is carrying out attentional tasks 
that are as simple as possible. These simple tasks should be 
accomplished in several different conditions, such as across 
different sensory modalities, so that it could be possible to 
identify the common features characterizing the pure act of 
attentional focalization. 
  A second kind of approach could be that of examining 
the OMs when subjects are presented with certain verbs, 
such as “to look” and “to listen”. Indeed, according to OS, 
these verbs designate the operation of applying attention in a 
pure form to a sensory “channel” (the visual one or the 
acoustic one, respectively), which implies not paying atten-
tion to any specific object. The data of these experiments 
should be compared with the data achieved when subjects 
use the verbs “to see” and “to hear”, which according to OS 
designate, on the contrary, the results achieved through ap-
plying attention to the relevant sensory channel. 
b) Operation of Representation (R) 
  When representing the mental image of something physi-
cal, surely the sensory receptors are not working, but the 
nervous structures involved in its perception could be, at 
least partially, active: therefore, in this case there could be 
more or less the same problems as when the object is actu-
ally perceived. On the contrary, when we simply understand 
the meaning of a word without forming the corresponding 
mental image, these problems should be absent or less im-
portant. Therefore, experimental conditions should be de-
vised that allow the formation of mental representations 
without the concurrent formation of the corresponding men-
tal image: for example, subjects should be told that their task 
is only to understand the meanings of words without forming 
the corresponding mental image. This could also serve to 
better understand the difference between these two phases. 
c) Presence Keeping (PK) 
  This operation is of fundamental importance. It is proba-
bly present in all mental categories, surely in correlators. 
Therefore, without it linguistic thought (as well as any other 
mental object or scene [1]) would not even exist. At first 
sight, it seems easier to identify the OM(s) corresponding to 
this operation than the OM(s) corresponding to attentional 
focalization and representation. Indeed, it could be enough to 
observe, by means of the aforesaid EEG techniques, what 
differences exist between two experimental conditions. In 
the first condition, a subject should be told to represent, 
separately, two objects (or an object and one of its features, 
i.e., colour, shape, etc.). In the second condition, the subject 
should be told to connect the two objects by means of the 
conjunction “and” (or to link the object and its feature by 
means of the correlation substantive-adjective). In fact, as we 
have seen in the second section, according to OS, both these 
correlations are produced by presence keeping. In such a 
kind of experiment, the only thing that seems to change is 
the very presence or absence of the operation of presence 
keeping. It would also be interesting to look for the differ-
ences (if any) between a situation in which the correlator is 
the conjunction “and” and a situation in which it is the “im-
plicit correlator”.  
  Although we are still dealing with the same operation 
(presence keeping), the situation gets more and more com-
plex when the correlational network of linguistic thought is 
involved, that is, when one or more correlations become the 
correlata of other correlations. In such a case, it could be 
harder and more complicated to get bioelectrical evidence 
(indexed by OM). Surely, we must start from situations 
where only one correlation is involved. 
d) Operation of Attentional Discarding (AD) 
  This operation can be easily recognized when the con-
junction “or” is used, as for example in the expression “glass 
or bottle”. In this case, we believe that both objects are fo-
cused on by attention and kept present, but when our atten-
tion focuses on the glass, we must exclude, discard the bot-
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the structure of the mental category referred to by the con-
junction “or” and that referred to by the conjunction “and”: 
the presence of the operation of AD in the former. The com-
parative analysis of the electrical activities (indexed by 
OMs) corresponding to pairs of expressions such as: “bottle 
and glass” vs. “bottle or glass” should therefore be the easi-
est way to reveal if and how this hypothetical operation is 
expressed in the EEG structure. It must be noticed, however, 
that also in this case the operation is always applied to some-
thing and that consequently we could encounter the difficul-
ties mentioned at point a). 
e) Operation of Comparison (C) 
  Our mind continuously makes comparisons. Every time 
we use words expressing some kind of judgment, whether 
concerning simple physical properties (like “high/low”, 
“big/little”, “long/short”, “strong/weak”, “heavy/light” etc.) 
or reflecting psychological or cultural qualities (like 
“good/bad”, “normal/abnormal”, “legal/not legal” etc.), we 
make comparisons. At this stage of experimentation, words 
expressing psychological and cultural judgments must be 
excluded, because they involve the assumption by the sub-
ject of some kind of attitude (such as an aesthetic one or an 
ethic one), that is, a very complex mental activity [16, 57]. 
No doubt the words expressing judgments concerning physi-
cal properties involve a simpler kind of mental activity; nev-
ertheless also with them we have to face a very complex 
situation because they involve either a spatial representation 
or some other kind of operation. Therefore, in order to carry 
out our experiments, it seems to us that it is better to start 
with the mental category “plural”, whose structure we be-
lieve to be simpler. Obviously, the operation of comparison 
implies that the two things being compared are both focused 
on by attention, and that the first thing is kept present while 
we pass to the second one. For this reason, both the opera-
tions of attentional focalization and of presence keeping are 
involved when a comparison is made. Moreover, also the 
operation of comparison is always applied to something: 
therefore, we have to face the aforementioned difficulties. 
f) Memory Operations (MO) 
  In the second section, we have said that, according to OS, 
memory operations are part of the structure of some mental 
categories. An example is given by the categories “the same” 
and “other/else”. Let’s briefly see the analyses Benedetti 
proposes for them [38]. There are a lot of objects of which 
many specimens exist, which are thus designated with the 
same word. For example, the word “dog” indicates each 
specimen of the class of “dogs”. If, in a speech, after having 
found the word “dog” we find it once again, we remember 
that the word has already been used, so we have to know 
whether the latter word is referred to the aforementioned dog 
(let’s call it dog A) or not. The mental category the same 
indicates that we have to focus our attention on the dog A 
retrieved from memory, while the category other indicates 
that we have to discard the dog A retrieved from memory 
and represent a new specimen of the class of dogs, let’s say 
B. 
  In the experiment, subjects should be showed first an 
item a belonging to the class A, then an item b belonging to 
the class B, then an item a1 of the same class of a, so that 
they can say “another a”. 
2) Mental Categories 
a)  The simplest and most used mental category is the one 
referred to by the implicit correlator. Considering its im-
portance and simplicity, it should be the first mental 
category to be taken into consideration when analysing 
the bioelectrical activity revealed by the aforesaid EEG 
techniques. Because we have hypothesised that the men-
tal category “and” and the implicit correlator have a very 
similar structure (see 1c), it is logical to study these two 
categories together. The experiments have already been 
outlined at point 1c. 
b)  “Numbers” and “plural” form a particular group of men-
tal categories. As we said, we suppose that numbers are 
the result of an iterative repetition of the same basic men-
tal operations. We think that “counting” consists of a se-
ries of operations, one following the other, of focalization 
of attention on each object of a group of objects which 
are considered equal (operation of comparison), main-
taining mentally present the preceding objects each time 
we add a new one. If each successive repetition is named 
by a different name we obtain the single numbers (“one”, 
“two”, “three” etc.), otherwise we obtain the plural. This 
iterative repetition should be mirrored in the EEG struc-
ture. 
c)  Some mental categories have a structure that is partially 
the same or are made up of the same basic mental opera-
tions, but in a different, sometimes reversed, order. We 
think that it is worthwhile taking into consideration some 
of these mental categories when performing the experi-
ments. Some examples are the following. 
i.  As we saw, OS hypothesises that the preposition 
“with” and the verb “to have” are based on the same 
core of operations (attention first focuses on an object 
A, then it also extends to another object B, because B 
is in such a relationship with A that attention is in-
duced to focus A and B as a unity, together), except 
that the verb “to have”, as all verbs, involves that we 
see the situation from the temporal point of view. The 
aforesaid analogy should be mirrored at the level of 
OMs. 
ii.  OS also proposes that the verbs “to have” and “to get” 
have the same structure, except that in the case of the 
verb “to have”, the result is something static (that is, 
the relationship we have just described between two 
objects remains constant throughout time), while, in 
the case of the verb “to get”, the result is something 
dynamic (the relationship, which is not present at the 
beginning, becomes present at a later moment). If this 
is correct, this should also be mirrored at the level of 
the OMs.  
iii The mental categories “same” and “other” have a 
structure that is partly the same and partly different 
and opposite (see above). 
iv. Of course, the mental categories “end” and “begin-
ning” should have an opposite structure. Benedetti 
has proposed that the category end indicates that at-
tention moves on an object A in a linear way until it 
meets with something different (operation of com-
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of separation between A and B or the last part of A. 
As far as the mental category of beginning is con-
cerned, attention moves on an object A in a linear 
way, then, it goes back until it meets with something 
different (operation of comparison), B, and focus on 
the point of separation between A and B or the first 
part of A [23]. 
v.  Most probably, the structure of the mental category 
“without” is partly similar to that of the preposition 
“with”. In fact, contrary to “with”, without indicates 
that the second object of the relationship referred to 
by “with” is missing. Therefore, in the case of “with-
out”, we do not have the same relationship between 
two objects as the one referred to by “with”, but 
something induces us to represent it anyway. What 
induces us to represent it may be the situation or a 
specific question (for example, when looking at a 
window without panes, we are led to say “window 
without panes”, because we are used to seeing and 
representing windows with panes; or we can answer 
that we are “without money”, if asked to say “how 
much money” we have). Consequently, the brain 
OMs related to these two prepositions should be 
partly the same and partly different. 
vi. As we have said, the preposition “with” and the 
meaning of the genitive case should have a partly 
similar and partly different structure (see above). We 
expect that these relations will be reflected in the 
EEG structure. 
3) Correlational Network 
  Al. and An. Fingelkurts maintain that the mean durations 
of OMs vary from 80-100 ms to 30 s [35]. Such durations 
are perfectly compatible with the durations of “correlational 
networks” hypothesised by OS. A correlational network rep-
resents a complete linguistic thought, that is, a sentence de-
limited by two full stops (according to OS, a full stop indi-
cates the end of a correlational network). OMs, or some of 
them, or a set of them could then correspond to these correla-
tional networks of different complexity. Indeed, the correla-
tional theory of linguistic thought is based on the main idea 
that linguistic thought is composed of elements (mainly rep-
resentations of physical or psychical things) that are some-
how connected to each other. Since these representations are 
probably generated in different areas of the brain, OMs (or 
some of them) may be the result of operational synchrony 
[26-28, 34-36] that mirrors the activity necessary to bind 
these representations together. To verify this idea, experi-
ments must be devised that highlight the differences in OMs 
between a situation in which subjects represent very simple, 
isolated objects, and a situation in which subjects generate a 
linguistic thought by means of these different objects. For 
example, subjects can be requested first to separately imag-
ine the meanings of “glass”, “bottle” and “cork”, and then to 
form the thought “glass and bottle with cork”.  
  In connection to this it will be interesting to look at the 
following hypothesis. There are sentences in which one word 
occurs repeatedly. In a brain model of language [6] postulat-
ing that each word is represented in one spatio-temporal 
brain pattern (OM in our interpretation), additional assump-
tions must be made in order to allow for a representation of 
sentences with multiple appearances of the same word. If 
there is only one OM representing an individual word, dif-
ferent states of activity of this OM may be assumed to corre-
spond to the number of occurrences of this word in a particu-
lar sentence. Another important issue is to try to show the 
existence in EEG structure of some pattern(s) corresponding 
to the implicit correlator, which is the most recurrent element 
in correlational networks (which represents sentences). In-
deed, in a correlational network, if the correlator is neither a 
conjunction, nor a preposition, nor a grammatical case, it is 
the implicit correlator. For example, in the following sen-
tence: 
  He often lends books and magazines to French boys 
which, from a certain point of view, can be considered a 
typical one (there is a subject, a verb, an adverb, a direct 
object, an indirect object, a conjunction and a preposition), 
there are four implicit correlators, as we can see below. 
  One can also verify whether, given certain sentences, 
there is a correspondence between the complexity of the 
relevant correlational networks and the complexity/duration 
of the OMs observed when these sentences are thought 
about. One can also devise some sentences whose correla-
tional networks have or share some structural relationships 
(such as, common parts, inverted parts, etc.), and then verify 
if similar structural relationships can be found at the OMs 
level. 
CONCLUSIONS 
  Modern neuroscience can no longer ignore the mind phe-
nomenon and is progressively starting to address the mind-
brain problem seriously. This paper offers one way of deal-
ing with this problem. We propose a plausible framework, 
which is based on the notion of operation and unifies within 
the same conceptual tissue mind Operational Semantics [20, 
23, 38] and brain Operational Architectonics [26-28, 34-36]. 
We also provide a set of first experiments aiming to verify 
the putative correspondence we put forward between the 
OMs and what we consider to be the basic structure of a lin-
guistic thought. As such, they can be further modified and 
developed. 
  Summarizing: The first step would be that of identifying 
the right level of correspondence between the (simple or 
complex) OMs discovered by OA and the EOMC, mental 
categories and correlational networks hypothesized by OS. 
Even if some first indications seem to show that some OMs 
are equivalent to basic mental operations (for instance, 
“keeping in mind” = “presence keeping”; “retrieval” = “rep-
resentation”), additional tests are needed to support the hy-
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tions (be it, for example, that of “keeping in mind”) are pre-
sent in different conditions where OS supposes they should 
be present (for example, when one uses the word “and” or 
the correlation adjective-noun) or not.  
  Ultimately, this research can be seen as a part of the 
larger research project concerning the neural correlates 
and/or neural constituents of phenomenal consciousness, 
where the term “phenomenal” refers to the undeniable facts 
(phenomena) of immediate subjective experience (including 
higher-order reflective forms) that occur to us (for a com-
plete discussion, see Revonsuo [1, 30, 36]. 
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